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This paper raises and defends three classes of objections to Ted Sider's argument from 
vagueness in his recent work, Four-Dimensionalism. The first class argues that Sider's 
case for four-dimensionalism is superfluous, that is, “mereologically promiscuous 
three-dimensionalists”1 can accept his argument yet maintain a compatible variety of 
three-dimensionalism that accepts the existence of temporal parts as improper parts of 
otherwise enduring wholes. Second, Sider's argument begs the question of unrestricted 
composition by presupposing an unrestricted conception of objecthood that the three-
dimensionalist can freely reject. Finally, Sider's project offends ontology by 
undermining a deep ontological distinction between temporal existence and extension. 
Even assuming that any defense of this distinction will be circular, Sider's account 
contradicts our commonsense and reflective thought concerning existence without 
sufficient reason to justify this revision. Since three-dimensionalism can preserve our 
distinctions in conjunction with granting existence to temporal parts, it is to be 
preferred. 
 
Introduction 
 
In Four-Dimensionalism, Ted Sider argues from unrestricted mereological 
composition, the position that all potential cases of composition compose a whole, to 
the unrestricted diachronic fusion of perduring wholes composed of temporal parts. 
Since it cannot be indeterminate whether a class of objects fuse, and any possible 
restriction on fusion would make it a vague matter whether fusion occurs, Sider argues 
that it must be the case that fusion is unrestricted: that fusion always occurs.2 This 
conclusion guarantees the existence of temporal parts. Further, persisting objects 
perdure, that is, they are extended in time like spatial objects are extended in space – by 
having distinct parts in different locations along a dimension. Sider claims that granting 
the soundness of this argument entails the truth of four-dimensionalism. In this paper I  
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will raise three criticisms against this argument: 
 
(1) Temporal parts are superfluous to the thesis of four-dimensionalism. 
Granting unrestricted composition and unrestricted diachronic fusion is 
fully compatible with three-dimensionalism. 
 
(2) Sider's argument is presumptuous: a controversial premise within the 
argument for unrestricted composition presupposes unrestricted 
objecthood which the three-dimensionalist can deny.  
 
(3) Sider's project entails undue revision to our commonsense distinctions 
between possible and nonsensical objects and an object's extension in 
space and existence in time. 
 
In this paper, I will anticipate Sider's responses and argue that these objections 
undermine his case regardless. I will also argue that “Ontologese”3
 
, the unrestricted 
language Sider claims to be speaking throughout Four-Dimensionalism, is wholly 
inadequate for this debate because it transforms genuine ontological questions into 
uninformative conceptual disputes. 
Definitions 
 
Four-dimensionalism is a thesis concerning the nature of how objects persist through 
time: it is the view that persisting objects perdure – that they are extended through time 
and composed of instantaneous temporal parts4. Three-dimensionalism is the view that 
objects persist by enduring - by being “wholly present at each time that they exist”5. 
The debate between these views is often framed over the existence or nonexistence of 
temporal parts. Several three-dimensionalists argue that this is only an ancillary 
assumption, however, and characterize the central disagreement as one over temporal 
extension and temporal existence6
 
. While three-dimensionalists claim that the way 
objects are extended in space is distinct from the way they exist in time, the four-
dimensionalist conflates the two forms of presence: objects extend in space by having 
parts at different places, while persisting objects extend in time by having parts at 
different times. This paper will assume that the bare existence of temporal parts, when 
divorced from additional claims about temporal extension, does not amount to de facto 
four-dimensionalism. My first objection will explore how this is possible. 
In the argument from vagueness, Sider understands four-dimensionalism as a thesis 
concerning temporal locality: a claim that, necessarily, for any object (suppose Ted), 
and any distinct, nonempty sets of times such that their union comprises the time-span 
of the object (suppose T1 and T2), there will be two objects, (Ted1 and Ted2) such that 
Ted1 has all the parts of Ted at T1, and Ted2 overlaps Ted at T27. By definition, the 
objects Ted1 and Ted2 are instantaneous temporal parts. The temporal locality thesis 
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thus claims that all persisting objects necessarily have instantaneous temporal parts, and 
are extended in time by possessing them. But what does it mean to be an instantaneous 
temporal part? 
 
While three-dimensionalists tend to index parts to time, the four-dimensionalist 
understands parthood atemporally, seeing temporal parts as parts of wholes simpliciter. 
To bridge the gap in terminology, Sider proposes a purportedly neutral definition of 
temporary parthood as: Necessarily, X is a part of Y at t iff: (i) X and Y each exist at t, 
and (ii) X's temporal part at t is part of Y's temporal part at t8
 
.  
What does it mean to be a temporal part at t? X is an instantaneous temporal part of Y 
at t iff:  (I) X is a part of Y, (II) X exists at, but only at t, and (III) X overlaps every part 
of Y that exists at t9
 
.  
These definitions will be crucial in Sider's step from diachronic fusion to four-
dimensionalism proper, but it is not obvious that they are as neutral as Sider claims. In 
section two, I will explain how these definitions may prove problematic in cases of 
material coincidence and how the three-dimensionalist may reject these definitions, and 
hence, the argument from vagueness as a whole.  
 
1. The Argument From Vagueness 
 
Sider will argue for the temporal locality thesis first by establishing an argument for 
unrestricted mereological composition, the position that, given the indeterminacy of 
restricting composition, any and all potential cases of composition must compose a 
further whole. Sider then applies this argument to the notion of a minimal diachronic 
fusion, that is, the minimal cross-time assignment of a non-empty class of objects to a 
set of times at which the class of objects exist. This assignment generates temporal 
parts that compose perduring wholes. In this section I will briefly summarize the key 
steps of these arguments, beginning with unrestricted mereological composition.  
 
1.1 Unrestricted Mereological Composition 
 
Roughly, the case for unrestricted composition runs as follows: If it is not the case that 
every class of objects has a fusion, then we can conceive of two possible cases, one in 
which composition occurs and one in which composition does not occur, which are 
connected by a continuous series of extremely similar cases10. Since composition can 
never be vague, there must be a clear point in this series where composition abruptly 
ceases to occur11. Such a cut-off is either vague, arbitrary, or anthropocentric, so 
composition must always occur. Given below is Sider's version of the argument12
 
: 
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P1  If not every class has a fusion, then there must be a pair of cases 
connected by a continuous series such that in one, composition 
occurs, but in the other, composition does not occur.  
 
P2  In no continuous series is there a sharp cut-off in whether 
composition occurs.  
 
P3 In any case of composition, either composition definitely occurs, 
or composition definitely does not occur.  
 
 C Every class has a fusion. 
 
 In defense of P3, Sider launches a sub-argument which hinges on two presuppositions – 
first, that vagueness is a product of semantic indecision rather than genuine ontological 
vagueness or ignorance, (call this condition V) and second, that logic can never be a 
source of vagueness (call this condition L)13. Proof: Suppose P3 is false, and 
composition is a vague matter. Suppose further that there is a finite world inhabited by a 
finite number of concrete objects, where concrete is understood as excluding abstract 
entities. Alleging that composition is indeterminate would mean that it was 
indeterminate whether there was an object in this world that was the fusion of the 
present concrete objects. Thus a sentence of the form “there are n concrete objects” 
would be indeterminate in truth-value14. Consider the logical form of this sentence: 
∃x ∃y[Cx & Cy & x≠y & ∀z (Cz → [x=z V y=z])] 15
 
  
Presuming V, what term in this sentence admits precisification16
 
? Presuming L, the only 
remaining potentially vague elements are the predicate C, the quantifiers, and identity. 
Sider argues none of these elements admit precisification, so it must be the case that the 
sentence has a determinate truth-value. Given this contradiction, we can conclude P3. 
From P1-3, we conclude C. But C only asserts that every class of objects fuse into 
another object. Whence four-dimensionalism?  
1.2 Unrestricted Minimal Diachronic Fusion 
 
“Under what conditions do objects begin and cease to exist?” Sider answers: in all 
cases17. Sider moves from unrestricted synchronic composition to the notion of a 
diachronic or cross-time fusion (hereafter D-fusion). D-fusions are products of an 
assignment function that takes one or more times as arguments and assigns nonempty 
classes of objects that exist at those times as values18
  
. The minimal D-fusion argument 
exactly parallels the argument for unrestricted composition, substituting assignment for 
case, and minimal D-fusion for composition. It derives the following conclusion in place 
of C:  
U: Every assignment has a minimal D-fusion19.  
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What does U entail? Recall that Sider claims that the four-dimensionalist thesis is that 
every persisting object, X, has temporal parts X1 and X2 at times T1 and T2, the union of 
which compose the timespan of the object X. Granting U, Sider believes that the four-
dimensionalist thesis follows.  
 
Here is how: if we suppose A to be the function which assigns some arbitrary object X 
to the instantaneous members of a set of times T at which it exists, then U guarantees 
the existence of an object X1, that is a minimal D-fusion of X assigned to some member 
t in the set of times T. Being a minimal D-fusion of X at t, X1 exists at, but only at the 
time t at which X exists, X1 is a part of X, and X1 overlaps every part of X that exists at 
time t20
 
. Recall Sider's conditions for instantaneous temporal parthood – X1 is an 
instantaneous temporal part of X, and hence, a temporary part of X. Granting 
unrestricted D-fusion, it must be the case that every persisting object has, and persists 
by way of possessing, instantaneous temporal parts. Hence four-dimensionalism. 
2. The Superfluousness Charge 
 
2.1 The Superfluous Objection21
 
: 
1. An object may persist by enduring or perduring.  
2. If an object persists, it will have temporal parts. 
3. These temporal parts compose a perduring object which is at best 
spatially coincidental with, but distinct from the object itself, which may 
persist by enduring.  
      ∴ Not all objects must persist by perduring.  
 
This objection maintains that granting unrestricted composition and unrestricted 
diachronic fusion is entirely compatible with three-dimensionalism. While this much is 
not to claim the truth of three-dimensionalism, it does undermine Sider's argument from 
vagueness as a necessary truth. Although Sider has chosen to understand the debate 
between these views as one over the existence of temporal parts, the three-
dimensionalist is free to accept their existence without the further claim that persisting 
objects are extended in time by way of possessing these temporal parts. The event-
objects composed of the temporal parts guaranteed by U, which have as their temporal 
parts fusions of ordinary objects at times, are simply spatially or materially coincidental 
with thing-objects. While thing-objects may persist by enduring, the spatially 
coincidental event-object persists by perduring.  
 
To clarify: suppose there is a case of unrestricted diachronic fusion. Let Ted refer to 
one of the many synchronic fusions guaranteed by unrestricted composition (that is, 
objects not assigned to times). Suppose now that Ted exists at T1 and T2. Sider's 
argument for unrestricted minimal D-fusion guarantees the existence of some minimal 
diachronic fusion Ted1 such that it has the value Ted at T1. Unrestricted composition 
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means that there is an object composed of Ted1 and Ted2. Call this object, Ted's life. 
The existence of this object, which perdures and is extended temporally, is entirely 
compatible with the notion that the initial object, Ted, otherwise persists by enduring. 
Ted's life, is merely spatially coincidental with Ted. Thus, Sider's argument only 
guarantees the existence of an event-object, which is at best the history of a thing-
object. To hold this, the three-dimensionalist will need to explain material coincidence, 
but this is a plausible auxiliary commitment22
 
.  
2.2 Sider's Counterargument 
 
1. To endure, an object and all of its parts must be wholly present. 
2. U guarantees that all objects have instantaneous temporal parts.  
3. A persisting object with temporal parts cannot be wholly present unless 
all its parts are present. 
⊥   A persisting object with more than one temporal part cannot have all of 
its temporal parts present at any one time. 
∴ Therefore no persisting object can be wholly present, and no object can 
persist by enduring.  
 
In response, Sider can claim that U guarantees the existence of temporal parts for any 
and all persisting objects. Ted1 is a temporal part at t of any synchronically fused Ted 
that exists at t, and this part-whole relation cannot be not merely spatial coincidence. 
Recall both Sider's definition of a part simpliciter and an instantaneous temporal part. 
The fusions Ted1 and Ted2 guaranteed by U satisfy both definitions by being parts of 
Ted, existing at and only at times at which Ted exists, and by overlapping Ted 
completely at those times. Thus, if the object Ted is to be wholly present, it will have 
all Ted's parts present, which would imply having both temporal parts present. But this 
is impossible. Thus enduring objects with temporal parts are absurd. Hence four-
dimensionalism.  
 
Yet, the three-dimensionalist can accept the existence of the temporal parts without 
conceding absolute parthood to them, only improper parthood. Surely, temporal parts 
overlap, but neither the part nor the object is part of the other simpliciter. The error in 
Sider's counter-argument lies in (3). All that is required for an object to be wholly 
present is for its proper parts to be present – since temporal parts are improper parts, 
objects can have temporal parts and yet persist by enduring23
 
.  
What does it mean to be an improper part? Consider for instance, the familiar example 
of the statue and the clay – the clay exists at the times at which the statue exists, is a 
part of the statue and wholly overlaps the statue at such times, satisfying Sider’s 
definitions. Yet we do not confuse the statue and the clay as parts of one another 
simpliciter – they are improper parts because they are related to one another by 
constitution24. A constitution relation just is the relation between any objects that are 
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materially coincidental at a time, that is, a constitution relation obtains when the same 
matter constitutes both objects25
 
. Likewise, while U guarantees that persisting objects 
have temporal parts, the three-dimensionalist can claim that these parts are materially 
constituted by the same synchronically fused object as the enduring whole, yet they 
are not part of one another absolutely. Temporal parts may compose a perduring whole 
over and above the enduring whole if we grant unrestricted mereological composition, 
but this event-object only stands in a constitution relation with the thing-object.  
Sider could respond: if the three-dimensionalist grants that some event-objects persist 
by perduring, why posit a separate and unnecessary mode of persistence for ordinary 
objects? Further, if we grant Leibniz’ law, what property distinguishes the enduring 
object from the otherwise identical perduring object besides the question-begging 
properties of their temporal presence? 
 
First, three-dimensionalism is necessary because it vindicates our common conception 
of material objects while accommodating the intuition that events perdure. Second, 
distinctions may be drawn between enduring and perduring objects on the basis of 
whether the object's properties are possessed by the whole or just the temporal parts, 
and whether these properties are relative to a time or intrinsic. Thirdly, it is not clear 
that a perdurantist model can claim parsimony over the three-dimensionalist. Kit Fine 
raises an interesting objection with the case of aromas: composite aromas, such as the 
scent of coffee and vanilla extract, exist only when both parts are present, spatially and 
temporally26. How can the four-dimensionalist account for these “fields” without 
requiring a separate, conjunctive mode of composition27
 
? The four-dimensionalist 
must either multiply entities themselves, or sacrifice explanatory power, and hence, 
cannot use this consideration as leverage over the three-dimensionalist. The three-
dimensionalist can also claim that if parsimony requires a single mode of persistence 
(which, admittedly, it need not) endurance is the more fundamental, for enduring 
thing-objects are necessary to populate event-objects – there is no such event as a 
basketball game without the enduring particulars of the players, the court, and the ball 
that compose the event.  
3. The Presumptuous Premise 
 
Recall Sider's P3 proof: if P3 is false, then a sentence of the form “there are n concrete 
objects” would admit count indeterminacy – given presuppositions V and L, this 
cannot be the case. What motivation is there to presume V and L? Suppose  ~V: one 
could argue that logic is never a source of vagueness, but that objects themselves can 
be. This would allow for count-indeterminacy to arise from indeterminacy inherent to 
the object being counted. The quantification is precise, but the object itself is vague 
(because reality is amorphous, for example). Sider argues at length in other works 
against vague existence, and the theoretical virtues acquired by adopting this position 
are scarce28.  
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Instead, suppose ~L. Perhaps three-dimensionalists can accept that the logical 
connectives and identity have definite meanings. Concerning unrestricted quantifiers, 
however, one could accept a definite meaning while maintaining that the domain over 
which the quantifier ranges is indeterminate29. Thus the vague term in the numerical 
sentence “there are n concrete objects” is the term 'object', the restrictions on which 
must be settled before the (definite) truth value of the statement can be assessed30. In 
P3 of his argument for unrestricted composition, Sider has presupposed an absolute 
domain – that any and all compositions count as a potential object within the scope of 
an unrestricted quantifier. If we reject this assumption, the count-indeterminacy in the 
numerical sentence arises from whether or not the fusion in question meets the 
conditions restricting objecthood (whatever they may be). This is not to say that 
objecthood is ontologically vague, because what it is to be an object may be precisely 
determined despite being ineffable, or otherwise accurately tracked by the conceptual 
structure of natural language. The three-dimensionalist could demonstrate that this 
restriction of objecthood is a logical joint in reality. So why accept bizarre “Siderian” 
objects as possible objects in the first place31? A plausible interpretation of the 
quantifier range could exclude Siderian objects on the same grounds a possible 
restriction on composition could exclude a class of objects’ composing - no such 
objects exist32
 
. By assuming unrestricted existence, Sider's argument begs his 
conclusion.  
Sider may contest: any proposed restriction on objecthood is as arbitrary as any 
proposed restriction on composition. Indeed, Sider considers conceptually relative or 
ineffable restrictions on objecthood too “wild” to argue against33
 
. But why reject 
informative restrictions if they track our ordinary understanding of what exists? In the 
next section, I argue that Sider is not justified in presuming an unrestricted conception 
of objecthood when it entails sacrificing and revising ordinary usage of the terms and 
deep ontological distinctions between existence and extension in time and space.   
4. The Charge Of Undue Revision 
 
Eli Hirsch objects to Sider's project on the grounds that it grants existence to bizarre 
objects. If there is no 'deep' ontological difference between eccentric “Siderian” 
objects and ordinary ones, Sider has reduced characteristically ontological disputes 
over what objects are real to conceptual disputes over what class of guaranteed 
existents are actually interesting or informative. For Sider, the question of whether two 
temporal parts compose a persisting whole is vacuous – they always do, even if these 
persisting wholes strike us as odd – my nose and the Eiffel tower, for instance, 
compose. Against this counter-intuitive implication, Kathrin Koslicki objects that by 
making the arrangement of matter irrelevant to composition, Sider's account is 
“exceedingly deflationary” 34. If internal unity makes no difference to the reality of 
objects, what meaningful ontological questions can be asked about them35? 
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Eli Hirsch interprets Sider's project as being motivated by considerations of eligibility 
– that some properties are more eligible to be referred to in speech, and it is only if we 
are lucky that there may be corresponding linguistic consensus on terms for these 
properties36. In Four-Dimensionalism’s introduction, Sider claims the purpose of 
ontology is to investigate the logical joints of reality, and if we interpret the quantifiers 
of a language as failing to quantify over equally eligible existents on account of their 
strangeness, our distinction will be unnecessarily vague37
  
. But why assume that 
considerations of eligibility override considerations of use when interpreting 
existence? 
In his introduction, Sider presupposes that existence is univocal38. Call this univocal 
existence E'. Sider grants that the use of quantifiers in natural language does not fit 
perfectly with E', rather use fits best with our folk understanding of existence (the 
existence of ordinary, medium-sized objects). Yet Sider thinks we must suppose there 
is a natural kind E' since it satisfies “the core inferential role we associate with 
quantifiers”39
 
. Yet Sider argues that if ordinary use does not quantify over strange 
objects, this is because English quantifiers are ordinarily restricted. Sider thinks 
ontology is concerned with E', and so the quantifiers quantifying over E' must be 
unrestricted. If this contradicts English, it is best to read Sider's work as if written in 
“Ontologese”, the language of fundamental ontology. 
One could reply: isn't the purpose of ontology to investigate what ordinarily exists? 
Sider claims that one ought to care more about answers to existence statements 
phrased in terms of E' rather than ordinary statements, since “Ontologese” quantifiers 
carve reality at the logical joints, while the joints supplied by use are simply 
conventional40. Sider further argues that reality is “ready-made” with a distinguished 
structure and all of its “subdivisions created equal”41. Fundamental to these 
subdivisions is a distinguished domain of existents, since all the other “eligible 
properties and relations presuppose objecthood and hence existence”42. Even Siderian 
objects are part of this class of existents, Sider argues, though they do not possess 
ordinary sortal properties, because of the equal nature of reality's subdivisions – since 
every joint is equal to any other, there is no reason to suppose languages privileges one 
over another. The strangeness of some existents is a product of their having the 
“wrong history” to possess sortal properties, not necessarily any incongruence with 
nature's joints43
 
. If their alleged impossibility is only based on our distaste for peculiar 
objects, then restricting their existence is ad hoc, and at best a conceptual truth 
imposed on nature, not an ontological truth per se.  
Assume that any defense of use outranking eligibility is circular and that ontological 
questions concern truths phrased in terms of logical joints. Must we accept four-
dimensionalism?  
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Adopting Sider's peculiar ontological project and the variety of four-dimensionalism it 
entails bears unwarranted revisionist costs to the joints we have reason to believe our 
common understanding of existent actually tracks. As Kit Fine recognizes, if the thesis 
of temporal locality dictates only that the three-dimensionalist accept the existence of 
temporal parts, the thesis proves relatively unproblematic44. Yet Sider's thesis also 
implies that we are conceptually confused to draw a distinction between material 
thing-objects and event-objects – for instance, we are conceptually confused to 
distinguish between an event's occurring at a time, i.e. 'the party was yesterday', and a 
thing's occurring at a time, i.e. 'Ted existed yesterday' 45. Further, four-dimensionalism 
entails that enduring objects are absurd, so reference to their existence in time is 
patently false. Thus four-dimensionalism claims that the distinctions we had reason to 
believe tracked reality are fundamentally misguided46
 
.  
But why presume that use is incapable of uncovering reality's joints when eligibility 
entails jettisoning a distinction between existence and extension that our experience 
and reflective thought confirms? Sider seems to want to avoid the dangers of 
anthropomorphizing reality. Revisionism without due cause is as dangerous as 
anthropocentrism, and to suppose that the subdivisions of reality are equal, and that 
objecthood is unrestricted is a positive metaphysical claim in need of strong defense – 
it is not a claim to be assumed uncritically. Without this premise, the argument from 
vagueness does not guarantee four-dimensionalism. Given the revision that follows 
from Sider's variety of four-dimensionalism, however, the burden of proof must 
effectively lie with the four-dimensionalist to demonstrate how our common 
judgments are so systematically in error, and to do so without reference solely to the 
existence of temporal parts, which the three-dimensionalist, as discussed earlier in this 
paper, can admit into our conceptual repertoire47
 
.  
Conclusion  
 
This paper has raised three objections to Ted Sider's argument from vagueness. First, I 
have argued that his temporal locality thesis is superfluous and entirely compatible 
with three-dimensionalism. Second I have argued that Sider's argument for 
unrestricted composition presumes an unrestricted conception of objecthood that the 
three-dimensionalist should not subscribe to. Finally, I have argued that Sider's project 
is founded on a meta-ontological project with troubling and unnecessary revisionist 
consequences. Insofar as four-dimensionalism excludes the possibility of enduring 
particulars, there is little motivation to accept it. Insofar as “Ontologese” is an error-
theory about our commonsense distinctions between temporal existence and extension, 
there is little motivation to speak it. Three-dimensionalism can preserve our 
commonsense distinctions while granting the existence of improper temporal parts – 
three-dimensionalism can accommodate considerations of both use and eligibility. It is 
therefore to be preferred.  
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